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Jimmy Carter’s Human Rights Policy and Iran: a Re-examination, 1976-79
In the late 1970s, the Iranian Revolution and the Iranian hostage crisis replaced
America’s ally, the Shah, with an Islamic Republic that, to the present day, poses a threat to
American interests in the Middle East. The two events left searing images in the minds of
Americans and signaled the beginning of America’s global struggle against Islamic extremists.
The individual who is often blamed for this “loss” of Iran is former president Jimmy Carter.
Because the crises in Iran occurred while Carter was in office, many critics have come to the
conclusion that Carter was a “weak and indecisive” president. 1 By examining outcomes alone,
they appeared to be correct. Although Carter publicly professed the desire to change America’s
role in international relations, his foreign policy was not particularly distinctive from his Cold
War predecessors in practice, and many critics believe that his unwavering commitment to the
Shah helped bring upon the revolution. However, outcomes alone do not tell the whole story.
As president, Carter was not blindly idealistic or loyal to the Shah or to the Iranian government,
and his policies were not solely responsible for “losing” Iran. In order to pass judgments on the
quality of Carter’s foreign policy, historians and critics must first carefully research the origins
of individual policies in order to determine why Carter chose the particular courses of action that
he did, and what other alternatives might have been available.
An initiative of Carter’s that has especially been misunderstood was his global human
rights policy. Like much of the administration’s foreign policy, its intentions were to set a new
moralistic course in international relations and to move America away from outdated Cold War
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ideologies. 2 However, Carter’s inconsistent implementation of the policy has led most historians
to disregard its importance. Because Carter appeared to defer to the foreign policies of previous
Cold War presidents, the issues of human rights and an American foreign policy infused with
morals appeared to be little more than shrewd political rhetoric. In terms of Iran, and like most
other Cold War foreign policy makers, Carter was reluctant to pursue a drastic new course. For
many years, the Shah had been effective at providing a certain level of stability to the Middle
East, and Carter did not want to be remembered as the president who upset this delicate balance.
Consequently, the issue of human rights would become the wildcard of Carter’s term in office.
The new and strikingly liberal policy would embolden Iran’s intellectual opposition and raised
the world’s hope in American humanitarianism, but it would also place Carter in a vulnerable
political position. As biographer Robert Strong writes, “Carter tried to deal with human rights in
a serious fashion without ignoring other foreign policy goals.” 3 This gave the appearance that
Carter was trying to have it all ways, and in the process he would satisfy no one.
This essay will demonstrate what effects Carter’s human rights policy had on the Iranian
Revolution and Carter’s presidency. In particular, the essay’s analysis will focus on the first two
years of Carter’s term, when human rights were especially a priority in his foreign policy and
when Iran’s various opposition movements experienced resurgences. Before examining Carter’s
human rights policy in relation to Iran, the ideological constructions of the policy will be
examined to determine Carter’s motives for advocating human rights and why Carter placed it so
high on his foreign policy agenda. Following this, and through the use of declassified
government documents, the Carter administration’s inconsistencies will be explored in order to
determine how the administration applied its human rights policy and how this affected internal
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events in Iran. Particular focus will be given to the Iranian opposition movements and how
Carter’s promise of human rights affected the nature of their protests. This essay does not
absolve Carter or his policies from responsibility, like many of his biographers have done. Nor
does it contend that Carter was solely to blame for the unfavorable events that occurred in Iran,
like many of his sharpest critics have claimed. What this essay argues is that during the first half
of Carter’s presidency, the policy of human rights gave his administration an opportunity to
change America’s relations with Iran and to cut ties with the Shah. More than anything, this
essay may be viewed as a case study of how the Carter administration’s human rights policy was
applied in countries and regions where great American interests were at stake. From this point, it
can be determined how the Carter administration formulated and practiced its foreign policy in
Iran, the reasons the President chose to maintain his support for the Shah, how Carter’s support
of the Shah affected Iran’s internal struggles, and how the policy of human rights continues to
obscure Carter’s legacy as a foreign policy maker.
The idea of a foreign policy framed around human rights publicly emerged first in 1976
as part of the Democratic Party’s election platform. 4 It was conceived by Carter and other
Democrats as a way for America to return to its “fundamental liberal principles that all too often
had been ignored or even ridiculed by cold war foreign policy professionals.” 5 According to
Carter, American foreign policy had been promoting repression instead of progress. 6 A year
before the election, Carter had expressed concern in his autobiography, titled Why Not the Best,
that the U.S. had fallen away from morality in its foreign policy. 7 In Carter’s eyes, recent
foreign policy makers, notably Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, had promoted a policy that
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defended American interests at the price of disregarding morality and America’s duty to uphold a
high standard in the world. 8 This doctrine of “realpolitik” was first implemented in the U.S. by
America’s original “Cold Warriors,” such as George Kennan, and had been applied by many
American leaders throughout the Cold War. 9 It stated that the U.S. must set aside its moralistic
policies and instead pursue a careful, pragmatic, and realistic foreign policy. A foreign policy
crafted around morals and idealism, according to the doctrine, only agitated nationalism and
communism in the third world, and would lead to more violence and upheaval, thus
compromising American interests abroad. 10 However, Carter believed it was unnecessary for
American foreign policy makers to choose between morality and interests; both could be
achieved if the overall moral standard in the world was raised. Carter believed it was the duty of
American leaders to construct a foreign policy “rooted in our values” that could properly “serve
mankind”. 11 In addition, Carter and the Democrats believed America’s realpolitik was playing
directly into the hands of the Soviet Union. According to this thinking, the U.S. was in no
position to call attention to the “deplorable repression” sponsored by the Soviets, since the U.S.
itself was supporting authoritarian dictators for the sake of its interests. 12 To Carter, the lack of
morality in foreign policy exemplified a broader trend of amoral American policy that
culminated in the Watergate scandal and Nixon’s resignation. 13 By reinstituting morality at
home and abroad through the promotion of global human rights, Carter believed he could restore
the standing of America’s political institutions, both in the eyes of the world and in the eyes of
the American people.
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5
Politically, Carter’s human rights policy was perceived as being a “no lose issue”. 14
According to Carter’s speech writer during the 1976 campaign, “liberals liked human rights
because it involved political freedom” and an end to America’s support of dictatorships, while
“conservatives liked it because it involved criticisms of Russia.” 15 In addition, even though the
American public may have disapproved of the tactics employed by Nixon and Kissinger’s
foreign policy, they did not widely disapprove of the results. 16 Carter rightly sensed that the
public did not want to sail too far off the foreign policy course set by the Republicans. However,
promoting continuity would not win Carter an election. 17 By advocating for human rights,
Carter could set himself apart from the Republicans without appearing to be too radical. Beyond
bipartisanism, human rights were perceived as the glue that could hold the Democratic Party
together, which had been bitterly divided in the previous two election losses. 18 In the mid1970s, the general public continued to hold Democrats responsible for the escalation of the
Vietnam War under President Lyndon Johnson. 19 Therefore, the promotion of global human
rights and policies that distanced the Democrats from the Cold War era could help them escape
their damaging legacy of the 1960s.
However, the motives behind Carter’s desire to restore morality and promote global
human rights went much deeper than politics. His personal experiences as a southerner growing
up in Georgia influenced his future decisions as a foreign policy maker. 20 Carter’s Christian
background and his mother’s atypical beliefs heavily affected the mindset of the budding
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politician. Young Jimmy had been an anomaly in the American segregated south because he
spent a considerable amount of time interacting with African Americans as a child. 21 In
addition, his mother had participated in the Peace Corps in India and believed very strongly in
desegregation. 22 These experiences and ingrained beliefs would profoundly affect Carter’s
mindset towards race relations and human rights for all people. When Carter served as a
member of a local school board as a young man, he refused to join the White Citizens’ Council
that strongly opposed integration in public schools. 23 Although he did not always publicize his
beliefs for fear of political backlash, Carter’s human rights policy was derived from an
upbringing in which he witnessed the dilemmas of an unequal society first hand. As president,
Carter would draw upon these experiences as he attempted to bring human rights and equality to
the political limelight.
Carter entered the Oval Office in January of 1977 believing that the Cold War had neared
its conclusion, and that the traditional fight against the Soviet Union and communism had
become outdated. 24 In recent years, Nixon and Kissinger’s foreign policy, no matter how
morally bankrupt, had brought about a détente between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the
Cold War seemed to be burning itself out. As historian H.W. Brands remarks, Carter “strove
manfully to refashion the national interest to suit the new post-Cold War era.” 25 New methods
and ideologies had to be implemented in order for America to restore its standing in the world
and make amends for its ill-conceived war in Vietnam. As Carter stated, an “inordinate fear of
communism” drove American foreign policy makers to “fight fire with fire” in areas of the world
that otherwise were unimportant to the U.S. The “tragic experience of Vietnam”, according to
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Carter, had shown Americans that “fire is better quenched with water”. 26 Although it would
soon be proven that the Cold War was far from being over, a “soft” foreign policy promoting
human rights initially appeared to be the solution for the new global picture that Carter
envisioned.
In his inaugural address, Carter stressed that America’s “commitment to human rights
must be absolute.” 27 In the early weeks and months of 1977, Carter, along with several key
members of his administration, set out to articulate what exactly he meant by “human rights”.28
Although there were other key elements to Carter’s foreign policy—such as scaling back
armaments and nuclear weapons, improving relations with America’s allies, and assisting
developing nations—human rights, at least publicly, was the administration’s top priority. 29 In a
speech delivered by the new Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, in April 1977, Vance explained
that all persons of the world possessed the “right to be free from governmental violation of the
integrity of the person.” 30 This meant that America must treat harshly those governments who
sponsored “torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; and arbitrary arrest or
imprisonment.” In addition, Vance stated that “civil and political liberties” must be upheld, and
that “vital needs,” such as “food, shelter, health care, and education,” must be ensured for all
citizens. It appeared as though the Carter administration would grant no exceptions to human
rights violators. In terms of the Shah of Iran, the administration privately expressed concern in
classified correspondence that their traditional ally was exercising “unsatisfactory” human rights
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practices. 31 Although not known at the time, the way in which Carter chose to address these
practices in Iran would turn out to be the major foreign policy issue of his presidency.
In order to enforce the human rights policy, the Carter administration realized that clear
consequences had to be established for violating nations. The leverage for this was American
humanitarian aid and financial assistance. To ensure that nations were in compliance with the
human rights standards set by the administration, as well those of the UN and Amnesty
International, the Carter administration dangled the carrot of the American dollar. 32 As Carter
stated early in his presidency:
In distributing the scarce resources of our foreign assistance program, we will
demonstrate that our deepest affinities are with nations which commit themselves to a
democratic path to development. Towards regimes which persist in wholesale violations
of human rights we will not hesitate to convey our outrage nor will we pretend that our
relations are unaffected. 33
Many of the regimes in question, including the Shah’s government in Iran, relied on
American financial and military support for survival. By stating that human rights violators
would no longer be American aid recipients, the Carter administration was hoping to force
nations into compliance. The nations that did comply were supposed to receive considerable
amounts of humanitarian and economic assistance. Since many of the nations in question were
poor and politically unorganized, they were also extremely dependent on American assistance.
Carter believed that not receiving American aid was a choice most countries would not dare to
make.
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However, some nations would challenge Carter’s resolve. The policy’s greatest test
would come in countries where the U.S. possessed historic mutual interest-based relationships.
The clearest example of this in the 1970s was Iran. For years, American leaders had maintained
a delicate relationship with Iran’s government under the Shah. In 1953 the CIA covertly
participated in a coup in which “the pluralistic regime of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq”
was overthrown and replaced with the Shah. 34 The Shah, or Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was
descended from a family dynasty that had long claimed authority as the historic rulers of Iran. 35
The close relationship the Pahlavi dynasty shared with Great Britain and the United States
encouraged the CIA to reinstall the Shah to power. The fear of Soviet expansionism, combined
with Iran’s geographic position on the Soviet Union’s southern border, aroused enough fears in
Washington to plot a replacement to Mosaddeq’s government. Also, the “loss” of China in 1949
and the war in Korea beginning in 1950 heightened concerns that other nations in Asia and the
Middle East would quickly succumb to communism. 36 Additionally, an unfriendly Iranian
government could have devastating consequences for Western economies heavily reliant on
imported Iranian oil. 37 The end result of the coup was a puppet regime in Iran, and the Shah
legitimized his government through authoritarianism and repression. 38 A mutual alliance was
established in which the U.S. and Iran defended one another’s interests. The U.S., through the
Shah, could contain communism and ensure access to Iran’s oil, and the Shah could maintain
authority and power in Iran through U.S. military aid and technical assistance. In 1955 the Shah
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even signed his country into the Baghdad Pact, which stated that its purpose was “the
containment of the Soviet Union” in the region’s affairs. 39
As much as the Shah was favorable to the interests of the U.S., he was equally as
detrimental towards the humanitarian situation in his own country. Even amidst the Shah’s
many reforms, the underclass of Iranian society showed little upward mobility. 40 In addition, the
civil rights and political freedoms in Iran under the Shah were generally regarded as deplorable.
Although the middle class in Iranian society grew steadily, the extent to which Iranians could
conduct collective political action was extremely limited. The historic liberal opposition to the
Shah, the National Front, was almost completely shut out of the political process. 41 The Iranian
secret police, SAVAK, would arrest political opponents without cause, imprison them, and
sentence them without trial. 42 Traditional political uprisings and protests through the media
were also ruthlessly suppressed. This environment created a climate of fear that helped to secure
the Shah’s power. Much of the technical apparatuses that SAVAK used to gather intelligence
and repress political opponents of the Shah were supplied by the U.S. 43 As the Shah’s power
waned in 1970s, SAVAK became increasingly violent; assassinations, bombings, staged fires,
and torture were all used to discourage Iranians from acting in opposition to the Shah. This led
Amnesty International to declare in 1975 that “no country in the world has a worse record in
human rights than Iran.” 44 For many years, the Shah got away with brutal governing tactics
because the U.S. supported his regime. However, by 1977, this era appeared to be coming to an
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end as Carter’s human rights policy spoke directly to the type of humanitarian and civil rights
violations that the Shah had relied on for years to maintain authority.
In the early months of his presidency, Carter did not publicly address the Shah’s human
rights violations, saving his concerns for private conversations. Carter realized that he had to
choose his public pronouncements carefully, lest he jeopardize American’s considerable interests
in Iran. As a confidential State Department memo explained, “A frontal attack by the United
States government on the human rights situation in Iran will backfire.” 45 However, the Shah
took notice that Carter was dissimilar in many ways to most other Cold War-era presidents.
Carter’s vow to promote human rights in every corner of the globe signaled to the Shah that his
special relationship with the U.S. might be affected. The first major sign of this change was the
decision to restructure arms sales to Tehran. 46 To help ensure that his government’s relationship
with the U.S. did not wane, the Shah began to relax restrictions against political protesters in the
spring of 1977. 47 Iran’s liberal nationalists took this as an opportunity to “start their campaign
against repression.” 48 In June of 1977, three members of Iran’s liberal movement published a
short letter demanding “the respect of constitutionalism and human rights.” 49 In addition, the
newly revived Iranian intellectual circle known as the “Writers Association” published a similar
letter signed by forty members later in the month. As one of the signers of the second letter
stated, “The government wouldn’t dare jail us in the present climate on human rights.” 50 Many
liberal opposition groups began to meet regularly and publicly. SAVAK and other security
forces were arresting fewer protestors and were employing less violent tactics than in previous
45
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years. 51 The relaxation of repression due to Carter’s human rights policy allowed the liberal
opposition a chance to grow and flourish. The members of these groups varied in occupation
and ranged from doctors and lawyers to writers, intellectuals, and other professionals. 52 The
common goal of these groups was to force the Shah to put an end to his despotic practices and
uphold Iran’s 1906 Constitution. 53
In addition to relaxing repression and allowing for some measures of peaceful protest, the
Shah also responded to the Carter administration’s private pressures that International Red Cross
volunteers be allowed to inspect Iran’s human rights situation. 54 In the summer of 1977, as the
Shah allowed the Red Cross access to Iranian prisons and Iranian courts, the Carter
administration began to take notice. 55 As a confidential memo stated in the summer of 1977, the
Carter administration was pleased by the Shah’s “recent significantly more open approach to
human rights matters.” 56 Another state department official also noted that the Shah had made
“significant and important developments in the field of human rights” that year. 57 It was clear
that the Shah was at least trying to meet the human rights principles that Vance articulated in his
April speech. Because of this, Carter’s relationship with the Shah began to improve by the fall
of 1977. The administration believed that the Shah was moving in a liberal direction and Carter
believed that it was safe to work out a new arms deal with Tehran. 58 Of course, the Shah’s
reforms were largely for show, as he desperately tried to avoid falling out of Washington’s favor.
In the same vein, Carter granted the Shah a great deal of leniency because of the unique
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relationship between the two nations. As a classified memo titled “Human Rights Goals – Iran”
stated in the first part of 1978, “U.S. interests in Iran must be seen against a complex set of
factors,” which included “the unusually broad and valuable relationship between the two
countries” and “Iran’s ancient tradition of authoritarian government.” 59 By framing the
relationship with Iran in this context, the Carter administration enabled the Shah to view his
relationship with Washington as purely interest-based and not pursuant on Iran’s commitment to
human rights. The Carter administration also intentionally refrained from keeping human rightsrelated data on Iran in order to put off having to take action against Tehran. 60 The Shah would
not have to democratize, as long as he was saving political face by meeting Carter’s minimum
human rights guidelines and was protecting American interests in the region. This type of
relationship would spell trouble for both leaders in the second half of Carter’s term.
The warming of relations between Carter and the Shah allowed both leaders to go ahead
with the Shah’s scheduled year-end visit to Washington in November of 1977. Amidst a barrage
of protest outside the White House, the two leaders met inside for talks that mainly focused on
oil, weapons deals, and the economic issues of the world. 61 The Shah’s human rights practices
were touched upon but were in no way the main focus of the talks. This agenda was hardly in
line with Carter’s public pronouncement that human rights were his administration’s top foreign
policy priority. Following the November talks, the White House released a statement to the
press indicating that “the two men had reviewed the positive steps Iran was taking on the matter
of human rights.” 62 A secret State Department paper addressed to Carter stated that “the Shah
left Washington ‘profoundly satisfied’ with the results of his talks with you” and that he was
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equally “gratified by your strong reiteration of the special relationship with his country.” 63 This
illustrates how the president and the Shah were mutually relieved that human rights had not
gotten in the way of seemingly more important matters, such as oil prices.
Much of the same sentiments were expressed during Carter’s New Year’s visit to Tehran.
In preparation for the trip, the Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, addressed a memo
to Carter outlining five imperative American foreign policy objectives relating to Iran that Carter
was encouraged to pursue in his talks with the Shah. 64 They included energy and oil concerns,
nuclear cooperation, and Middle East stability. Christopher’s last listed objective was human
rights concerns, and only as they related to maintaining Iranian law and order. The low priority
given to human rights would continue during the actual visit. Even as Iran’s human rights
situation was once again deteriorating in the last three months of 1977, Carter was encouraged by
State Department officials not to pressure the Shah on the issue for fear that the Shah would not
“prefer it”. 65 The toughest action Carter was urged to take in regards to human rights in Iran was
to “encourage the Shah to continue the positive course” established in the spring and early
summer of 1977. 66 During the New Year’s talks, Carter gently broached the subject of human
rights and was once again reassured by the Shah that his regime was very much concerned with
human rights for all of its citizens. This appeared to be good enough for Carter, because on New
Year’s Eve, he would deliver the greatest praise for the Shah of his presidency. At a state dinner
that night, Carter toasted the Shah by claiming that “Iran, because of great leadership, is an
island of stability.” Carter continued by stating that the Iranian people loved and admired their
63
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leader, and that a “remarkable” transformation had taken place in Iran due to the Shah’s great
“wisdom,” “judgment,” and “sensitivity.” 67 Although some of Carter’s hyperbole must be
understood in the context of the festive environment, his toast cannot fully be dismissed because
it did represent the administration’s reinforcement of its commitment to the Shah.
The friendly manner of the Carter-Shah meetings in November and the new year
encouraged the Shah to believe that his relationship with Washington was solidly intact. This
allowed the Shah to once again disregard human rights in Iran since he had little fear of reprisal
from his lifeline, the United States. Crackdowns on liberal opposition groups by the police and
SAVAK intensified in the winter months of 1977, including those on opposition meetings and
peaceful protests. 68 The correlation between the Carter-Shah meetings and an increase in
government-sponsored repression appears high. Beating, arrests, and covert violent attacks
against “freedom seekers” all increased as 1977 came to a close. 69 The Muslim wing of
opposition fared even worse. SAVAK launched a campaign in the late months of 1977 and the
early months of 1978 to eliminate the leaders of “clandestine guerrilla groups.” 70
However, by the middle of 1978 it became clear that the Shah’s strategy had backfired, as
the many resistance factions began to join together in order to achieve the common goal of
ousting the Shah. 71 The Shah’s violent tactics especially encouraged the poor masses of Iran’s
urban centers to join the emerging Islamic movement. State sponsored repression had
encouraged many Iranians to collectively rally around their religious institutions located in large
urban areas. Demographically, Iran had transformed from a rural nation into an urban one with
67
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fifty percent of the total population residing in towns or cities by the late 1970s. 72 This dense
concentration of population “provided the occasion for substantial displays of mass protest” that
would not have been possible years before. 73 It also allowed the Islamic movement to preach its
simple message to Iran’s large population of poor Muslims—that the Shah was degrading
“Islamic standards of behavior and belief” and thus had to be replaced. 74 Religion, according to
some historians, was “the most efficient vehicle for channeling the revolutionary mood” among
the masses. 75 The liberal opposition did not possess this advantage, as they preached reform
messages that most of Iran’s Muslim citizens could not relate to their own circumstances. The
outcome in 1978 was that Iran’s liberal movement weakened while the Islamic movement gained
strength. 76 The result for Carter was a nightmarish scenario, as his “island of stability” was
about to become anything but.
Although the liberal opponents of the Shah were not fond of America’s historic
intervention in Iranian affairs, their yearnings for a liberal and democratic society matched up
well with Carter’s human rights policy and America’s founding principles. In contrast, the
radical Islamic movement expressed no desire to modernize Iran or embrace liberal reforms. 77
As the Shah continued to waver on human rights, and as the religious movement gained strength,
the question over why Carter was not able to shift course and endorse Iran’s moderate liberal
reformers remains. As explained earlier, liberal nationalists originally considered Carter’s
human rights policy to be an opportunity for mobilization. The tactics of these liberal opposition
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groups were almost completely non-violent, and its members consisted of professional and
intellectual citizens. They professed their displeasure by writing pamphlets, demonstrating in
small groups, and publishing newspapers. 78 This non-violent civil disobedience should have
appealed to a man like Carter, whose own personal experiences included a southern upbringing
in the midst of the American civil rights movement. The liberal opposition of Iran gave Carter
an opportunity to fully implement his human rights policy and support a much needed and
peaceful regime change in Iran. The public principles of Carter’s human rights policy, as stated
by Vance in April of 1977, were very much consistent with the demands of Iran’s liberal
opposition. However, these reasons were not enough for Carter to terminate his relationship with
the Shah. The Shah may have been a world class human rights violator, but he had been the safe
option for many years. Carter, like his predecessors, was reluctant to give up on America’s
friend and ally.
Both Carter and the Shah were caught off guard in the latter part of 1978 when protests in
Iran began to bolster popular resentment. 79 One of the reasons for this was the reliance of Carter
and the Shah on SAVAK intelligence briefings. Because the U.S. Foreign Service, including the
CIA, did not collect data on Iran in order to hide human rights violations, SAVAK became the
eyes and ears for the conditions on the ground. 80 The reason for the lack of U.S.-produced
intelligence is because Carter remained adamant in allowing the Shah to work out his internal
problems without covert or direct American interference.81 However, this stance led to flawed
intelligence that only told the Shah what he wanted to hear, which in turn misled American
foreign policy makers as well. As an intelligence briefing summarized from September 1978:
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“the Shah is expected to remain actively in power over the next ten years.” 82 In disgust over
such a misevaluation, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives would later state in a study
on Iranian intelligence that “no reports based on contacts with the religious opposition had
appeared” before late 1977, and that “there was absolutely no reporting on the internal situation
during the first quarter of 1978.” 83 Carter’s inaction on Iranian matters was directly connected to
the misleading intelligence reports he received, which led him to believe that the Shah had
accepted the message of promoting human rights and that political opposition in Iran was still
moderate and peaceful in nature. In addition, these reports encouraged the perception that the
Shah’s power was firm. However, as 1978 came to an end, this fallacy began to reveal itself. As
far back as January 1977, before Carter’s inauguration, the State Department produced a policy
paper stating that a “smooth transfer of power” in Iran was unlikely after the fall or death of the
Shah because of Tehran’s reliance on “one man” leadership. 84 The fact that Carter knew this but
did not take steps to line up a proper successor in Iran shows that he had been misinformed of the
real political situation. Even Carter, whose close personal ties to the Shah have been well
documented, would likely have withdrawn his support earlier if he was aware that the Shah’s
government was on the brink of collapse.
However, by the end of 1978, even misleading intelligence reports could not mask the
truth. Protests were increasingly turning into violent unrest, and the Shah’s security forces
became reluctant to use force to suppress them. 85 Amidst this turmoil, Carter finally began to
publicly distance himself from the Shah. In December 1978, he stated that although his
administration would “prefer the Shah to maintain a major role in the government,” it was “in the
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hands of the Iranian people” and he would not intervene with U.S. forces to bail out the Shah. 86
Carter’s sentiments signaled the death knell for the Iranian leader as he could no longer rely on
the American umbrella to keep him safe. As 1979 began, it was too late for Carter to distance
the U.S. from Iran’s problems—the historical relationship between the two nations was too deep
and his own words and actions had been too supportive of the Shah. The Islamic movement led
by Ayatollah Khomeini referenced the Shah’s closeness with America as a way of agitating the
Iranian masses and bolstering the revolution. 87 By the end of the next year, an Islamic Republic
was solidly established in Tehran, and the Shah was receiving treatment for cancer in exile.
The Shah had served as America’s greatest and most important ally in the region. He had
allowed the U.S. cheap and unrestricted access to Iran’s oil, and had presided over a long period
of Middle East stability. However, with the Shah out of power, America suddenly appeared
vulnerable. Following the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Carter
was forced to institute the “Carter Doctrine” in his 1980 State of the Union address. In it, he
warned that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be
regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States.” 88 Carter’s early
pronouncements were correct: the U.S. had entered a new period in history. However, it was not
an era in which outdated Cold War ideologies would be replaced with new liberal foreign
initiatives, such as human rights. Instead, as historian Andrew Bacevich explains, the last two
years of Carter’s presidency marked the beginning of a new effort on the part of American
foreign policy makers to “guarantee the ever-increasing affluence” of American society, meaning
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the protection of America’s access to cheap Middle Eastern oil. 89 Since the U.S. had lost their
most reliable ally in the Middle East, U.S. leaders felt compelled to forcefully defend American
interests in the region in the years that followed. In the face of such momentous problems, it is
easy to understand why Carter’s human rights policy in Iran has been misrepresented and even
forgotten about.
Carter’s human rights policy also failed in Iran because, much to his chagrin, it could not
escape the boundaries or the ideologies of the Cold War. Carter believed that America had
entered a new phase in foreign relations upon his election in 1976. He believed that the
traditional fight against Soviet communism had become outdated and unnecessarily taxing to the
U.S., both in terms of dollars and in American effort. However, even before the fall of the Shah
and the Carter Doctrine, Carter’s foreign policy in practice was still framed around the same
concerns as his predecessors. Carter’s promotion of human rights indirectly supported the
“realpolitik” doctrine he sought to escape. Although professing different rhetoric in public,
Carter’s secret correspondence within his administration was littered with references to the
Soviet threat and containing communism. As Frank Ninkovich explains, “human rights, because
they epitomized the enormous contrast between the ways of life created by the two ideologies,
was also useful as a symbolic way of fighting the Cold War.” 90 Since Carter practiced a foreign
policy very similar to that of his Cold War predecessors, he could have framed human rights as a
tool of fighting global communism. But by insisting that his foreign policy and human rights
initiatives existed outside of the Cold War, Carter confused foreign governments and alienated
the very groups that a pro-human rights policy was best suited for. Iran’s liberal opposition is a
perfect example. Carter could never bring himself to support Iran’s liberal nationalist movement
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as a successor regime, even though his human rights policy appeared to speak directly to what
they were advocating for. The leftist leanings of the liberal opposition and their supposed
sympathies to communists could never be accepted by Carter or any American foreign policy
maker of the time period. 91 This was predetermined by traditional Cold War concerns, whether
Carter acknowledged it or not. Similarly, and following perfectly with the doctrine of
“realpolitik,” Carter put aside his moralistic impulses in Iran because of the Soviet Union’s
geographical proximity and the desire for regional stability.92 For the first twenty-five years of
the Cold War, the U.S. had formed a “special commitment” to the Middle East by supporting
especially oppressive monarchies in Iran and Saudi Arabia. 93 Carter was in no way ready for
America to withdrawal its historic support from such oil-rich nations, even if their leaders
blatantly continued to deny human rights. Once again, Carter’s human rights policy was halted
by Cold War realities and American interests. In the last two years of his presidency, Carter
would be forced to publicly embrace his failures and accept the continued existence of the Cold
War. The Carter Doctrine, which came on the heels of the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and
the beginning of the Iranian hostage crisis, put Carter into the uncomfortable position of
ratcheting up military spending and admitting that the Cold War had not yet reached a
conclusion. 94
The result of this was a foreign policy and a president that appeared inconsistent and
indecisive. The great moral principles that had driven his entire life seemed lost in Carter’s last
two years in office, as he was forced to go against his initial policy of human rights and
reinvigorate the Cold War. However, this does not mean his administration’s human rights
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policy was directed by empty idealism. As biographer Peter Bourne states, “Carter was guided
by a consistent set of values and beliefs” that remained with him for his entire life, including
while he was president. 95 Carter was not a political “flip-flopper,” nor did he hastily throw
together different policies in hopes that something positive would result. 96 Carter was a firm
proponent of human rights and remains so to the present day. His human rights policy has been
much maligned and yet Carter has never regretted it; ideological consistency has never been his
problem. However, Carter ultimately fell short because, for over half of his presidency, he
refused to acknowledge that he was a Cold War president. Similarly, and for various reasons,
Carter could not change course in his official Iranian policy, even as the Iranian revolution
engulfed and destroyed the Shah’s regime. His human rights policy appeared to give his
administration a great opportunity to end America’s client relationship with Iran and to formulate
a new Middle East policy for the post-Cold War world Carter envisioned. However, Carter, like
most other Cold War presidents, could not commit to the unknown and felt it was safer to
continue the foreign policy already in place. The fear of being responsible for losing Iran, what
historian Frank Ninkovich would define as the fear of a “terrible failure,” moved Carter to
continue America’s support for the anemic Shah. 97 A regime change did eventually come to
Iran, but it came in the form of a revolution that was unfavorable to the interests of the U.S.
Even amidst these outcomes, Carter stated in his memoirs that the effectiveness of his human
rights policy should not always have been measured by “inches, pounds, or dollars”; better
judgments of his policies were to be found in the “revival of hope” and the “lifting of the human
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spirit” in oppressed peoples. 98 If this standard was universally applied, than Carter’s human
rights policy in Iran was, in part, a success; it did revive hope in Iran’s liberal opposition.
However, because of the Cold War and America’s historic relationship with the Shah, Carter
could not follow their “hope” and “human spirit” for liberalization all the way through. Thus,
the failure of the United States in Iran became the failure of Jimmy Carter as well.
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